수입국의 상계관세 결정 방식에 따른 최적 상계관세 전략과 수출국의 보조 전략

This study examines the optimal countervailing duties of a home country and the optimal subsidies of a foreign country according to the methods of determining countervailing tariffs. It constructs a simple two-country model in which foreign firms export their products to the home country and compete against its firms. The foreign government subsidizes the production of its exporting firms and the home country retaliates against foreign subsidies using countervailing tariffs. The home country's government uses three methods of determining countervailing taxes: the Lesser Duty Rule, the WTO standard rules, and the Adverse Facts Available. This paper shows first that, under the Lesser Duty Rule, if the number of foreign firms is sufficiently large but the number of home country firms is sufficiently small, then the home government will not impose countervailing duties. On the contrary, in the opposite case, it will impose partial countervailing tariffs. Second, under the WTO standard rule in which the maximum countervailing duty is limited to the total amount of the foreign subsidy, the government will set countervailing tariffs at a level that completely offsets the subsidies' damage. Third, the government will raise countervailing tariffs to trade-prohibitive levels when using Adverse Facts Available. Finally, in all three methods, if the home government levies optimal countervailing tariffs, then it is optimal for the foreign government not to subsidize its firms.