과잉투자와 미래이익에 대한 주가정보성 및 이들 관계에 감사인의 특성이 미치는 영향

Company has the incentive to increase their growth potentiality through investment activities and to gain an edge in competition with peers. However, according to the previous studies, it was likely to happen the over-investment when manager pursue opportunistic behavior such as manager’s status, compensation and prestige. This problem may aggravate the lack of accounting information transparency. Therefore, since over-investment company has high possibility to report the low-quality accounting information, it is difficult to provide high-quality accounting information to predict future profits. In this study, we argue how investors recognize corporate over-investment propensity and how corporate over-investment propensity affects informativeness about future earnings. This study is to extend the prior studies that investigate the information content of corporate over-investment. we measure the effect of over-investment on future earnings using the FERC. FERC model examines how much information about future earnings reflected in the change in current stock price. We empirically test how investors recognize corporate over-investment. And also we test whether there is a difference in the effect of over-investment on stock price informativeness about future earnings according to the auditor characteristics measured by industry specialist auditors, audit fees, audit hour and managerial ability. Our research results as follows. First, the over-investment decrease the informativeness of the future earnings on the stock price(measured by FERC). Second, FERC of the company with industry specialist auditor, or paying higher audit fee, or reporting higher audit hour is relatively higher than otherwise.