이인칭 관점과 법이론적 변용 가능성

This paper aims to seek a new approach of theorizing the nature of law. I will attempt to examine the implication to construct legal model from moral theory explaining the nature of morality via Second-Person Standpoint. There are three standpoints from which most philosophers try to account for the nature of morality: the First-Personal Standpoint, the Second-Personal Standpoint, and the Third-Personal Standpoint. In this paper I will explore the systems of Second-Personal Standpoint, especially by focusing on Stephen Darwall’s The Second-Person Standpoint theory(SPS), and explore possible ways to adapt his theory into legal theory. In the first section, I will provide a summary of Darwall’s second-personal standpoint theory. I will review his basic background premises including research intention, purpose and theoretical origin. And then I will look into his core concepts, main thesis. Lastly I will suggest three ways of interpretation and examine each. In the second section, I will flesh out Darwall’s theory on reason-giving as it relates to the Second-Personal Standpoint and provide several criticisms. In the third section, I will examine his account of moral obligation and his criticisms of the First-Personal Standpoint relating to moral obligation. And then I will take his claim into the legal context and evaluate the validity and desirability of it. In the fourth section, I will consider the scope of the Second-Personal Standpoint and look at arguments which might show that the Second-Personal Standpoint is weaker than Darwall presumed. Finally, I will discuss overall implications and limitations of admitting and adapting his second-personal Standpoint into legal theory in both perspective of moral and legal theory. This is a critical study on Darwall’s SPS, and I ultimately seek to design criterion to construct a model of second-personal jurisprudence.