네트워크 외부성과 기업 규모에 따른 담합 허용의 경제적 효과

This study analyzes the potential for collusion between leading firms and following firms in an Stackelberg oligopolistic market with network externalities. In particular, this study specifically investigated the effects of collusion between following firms in the network industry on the strategies and market equilibrium of the firms, and the main results are as follows. First, the size of the market( ) and the degree of network effects( ) affect the collusion strategies and market equilibrium. Second, as the market size and degree of network effects increase, the area of possibility for collusion among followers expands, and when the network effects are very large, the incentive for them to collude is weakened. Third, when considering strategic collusion, the market can cause social losses due to the discrepancy between private incentives and social incentives. However, when network effects are moderate, collusion among firms with small market shares incurs less social losses than collusion among firms with large market shares. Therefore, collusion or R&D cooperation among firms with a small market share can actually improve social welfare. In other words, in view point of welfare, when network effects exist in specific ranges and leading firms have large market shares, allowing collusion among follwing firms may be considered. Thus, in markets where network externalities exist, a differentiated collusion regulation policy is necessary depending on the relative weight of the firms and the market structure.