기업의 소유집중도와 지급정책

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership concentration and payment policy of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Total payment decrease as management concentration measured by Herfindahl's index increase, total payment decrease as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase. Total payment decrease larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. And, total payment decrease individual largest shareholder's equity holdings than both financial institution largest shareholder's and firm largest shareholder's equity holdings. These results support the hypothesis proposed by Shleifer and Vishny(1986) that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. In conclusion, ownership concentration appears to have a critical impact on payment policy of firms listed on Korea Exchange. Large shareholders of Korea firms can exercise a comprehensive effects on the payment policy of firms, and can expropriate the wealth from external minority shareholders. This evidence supports the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on payment policy for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.