가족지배와 기업의 자본투자의사결정 효율성간의 관련성

This study aims to examine if capital investment efficiencies vary depending on whether the firm is family－controlled or not. This study defines family－controlled firms as those with 50% or more family stake, or those which have family members in the top management. The empirical results are as follows：First, family－controlled firms show significantly negative relation to inefficient investments (investments which are over or under the optimal level). Second, this study analyzes the impact of investment opportunity and cash flow on investment decision in order to investigate what motives family－controlled firms make their investment decisions with. The result shows that with family－controlled firms, the relation between corporate investment and investment opportunity is even more strongly positive. This implies that family－controlled firms’ capital investments react more sensitively to the investment opportunities, resulting in proactive and aggressive investments. This also means that family－controlled firms have limited motives for over－ or under－investments caused by internal cash availability. The result of this study can be summarized that with family－controlled firms, the family shareholders’ long－term investment horizon, active participation in management, etc. decrease agency costs and information asymmetry and generate positive effects on the firms’ investment decisions.