아리스토텔레스의 형평(epieikeia): 구체적 타당성을 위한 덕

In this article, I aim to specify the content of the virtue of equity, which Aristotle sketches only briefly in Nicomachean Ethics Book 5, Chapter 10, by applying it to Korean judges. I start by explaining what rules are, their characteristics and values ​​(section II), and examine the areas in which judges have the discretion to deviate from legal rules and guidelines in light of the specific circumstances of particular cases (section III). I contrast the virtue of equity with the vice of disregarding legal rules and the vice of worshiping legal rules (section IV), and argue that the virtue of equity is actually compatible with the rule of law which is often considered to be in conflict with it (section V). I further clarify the nature of equity by examining closely related virtues such as judicial wisdom, temperance, perseverance, and courage (section VI). I explain the process in which an inexperienced judge, with the help of experienced judges, develops the relevant character traits and the intellectual ability for independent thinking, through the experience of equitable trials (section VII). Hard cases, I argue, provide judges with the opportunity to exercise the virtue of equality and live an interesting and meaningful life (section VIII). This article demonstrates that Aristotle's virtue ethics is a promising research program that is applicable to contemporary circumstances, and supports moral particularism, the view that the criterion of right action is not codifiable into exceptionless rules.