상장기업 임원 보수 결정요인 및 특성에 대한 연구: 2014-2018년 자료를 이용한 분석

This is to analyze the compensation determination factors and performance linkage of executive officers working for listed companies in Korea. The main results of this paper, which used compensation data for executives of companies from 2014 to 2018, are as follows: First, compensations of executives of Korean companies are linked to management performance. Last year’s ROE increases by 10 percent, and next year’s compensation increases by 2 percent (6 percent). Secondly, there is a Chaebol premium and a controlling shareholder premium, in which executives of large enterprise groups (Chaebol ) are paid more than executives of non-Chaebol com panies and executives of controlling shareholders are paid more by professional management. The Chaebol premium is 22 percent and the controlling shareholder premium is 77 percent. Third, pay-performance sensitivity, which is the result of large enterprise groups, is higher than non-enterprise groups. A 10 percent increase in ROA would increase 14 percent. This figure is much larger than 4 percent of non-enterprise group executives, and this is a statistically significant difference. It can be interpreted that the policy intention to change the compensation structure by matching the interests of executives with those of shareholders through the disclosure of compensation works stronger in large business groups.