지배주주의 초과지배권과 기업실패 : 생존분석을 응용한 영향관계 분석

This study analyzed the effects of excess control rights of controlling shareholders on corporate failure for companies listed on the Korea Exchange. For this analysis, the Cox proportional hazard model used in the survival analysis method was applied. The analysis period was from 1997 to 2017, and a total of 26,590 samples (company-year) were used. The analysis results is as follows. The effect of the controlling shareholder's excess control rights on corporate failure confirmed that the greater the controlling shareholder’s excess control rights, the lower the likelihood of corporate failure. This was different from the expectation that a company with a large amount of excess control rights by the controlling shareholder would have a high probability of the agency problem caused by the controlling shareholder, which would increase the possibility of corporate failure. In Korean companies, it could be understood that the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder had a greater effect on stabilizing the ownership of the company, thereby lowering the possibility of failure. These results were the same in the results of analyzing the sample companies by dividing them into large companies and SMEs. In Korea's listed companies, it could be understood that, regardless of the size of the company, if the excess control rights of the controlling shareholder increases, it will bring a stabilizing effect of ownership to the company and reduce the possibility of corporate failure.