본사의 자회사 통제: 차별화 vs. 동질화

This study investigated the nature and features of subsidiary control in a multinational firm. Recognizing the differences among business units, research on headquarters (HQ)-SBU relations has more and more focused on the business level. Most of the research is based on the premise that each subsidiary context is different and thus each HQ-subsidiary relation presents a different control problem. They have argued that the control mechanisms of HQ should differ depending on the specific characteristics or contexts of each business unit or subsidiary. This differentiated control view implicitly assumes that HQ is able to manage its subsidiaries differently. Proponents of differentiated control, however, have not actually proved that HQ controls its subsidiaries differently. In contrast, research following a uniform control approach has pointed out the difficulty of differentiated control across subsidiaries or of changes in corporate control style. These conflicting views indicate a need for more in-depth research on whether HQ controls its subsidiaries differently or uniformly. The purposes of this study were addressed through the in-depth case study. A qualitative and inductive field research is used to analyze the modes of control and to generate the factors affecting HQ control style of subsidiaries. For a comprehensive analysis and a comparison of the corporate control styles of subsidiaries, I focused on a single firm and its two foreign subsidiaries with contrasting characteristics. The case study company is one of the world leaders in its business area (industrial goods) and its HQ is located in Korea. Research based on the differentiated control view has identified the variables, such as competitive strategy, strategic mission, local environment, and subsidiary competence as the subsidiary-specific contingencies that influence HQ-subsidiary relations. Accordingly, I selected two completely different subsidiaries of the company in terms of these four dimensions in order to examine the explanatory power of the two conflicting views. I collected various types of data through interviews, observations, documents, and archival records, which permitted verification through triangulation and provided a solid basis for the theory development. I followed a grounded theory methodology to analyze the field data. I developed a working framework based on extant theory and initial data. I continuously compared the emergent theoretical interpretations with the evidence from the data. This iterative process of traveling back and forth between the data, pertinent literature, and emerging theory led to the refinement of my framework and theoretical interpretations. The findings suggest that strategy control is a distinct and salient form of control in HQ-subsidiary context, and HQ applies control mechanisms uniformly across its businesses with contrasting strategies and contexts. I found that the case company had strong cultural control over its subsidiaries through the extensive transfer of managers and the introduction of HQ-style human resource management system. It also employed output and behavior control through the formal performance evaluation system and the informal communication network respectively. The strategy control, however, was weak although the formal systems and processes for strategy control were established. These control mechanisms were almost uniform across different subsidiaries. Juxtaposing this result and my enduring observation of the sample company leads to the conclusion that the uniform control perspective is more realistic and persuasive. The management style of HQ does not change easily because it has been shaped over the firm’s history and reflects a perspective of business and organizational culture. It is therefore difficult for HQ to adapt its management style to the needs of different subsidiaries. Finer analyses based on in-depth interviews and observations revealed that many factors kept HQ from controlling the subsidiaries differently. The dominant logic and internal configuration concepts were partly useful in explaining the application of uniform control mechanisms to subsidiaries. In addition, I identified the diverse factors, such as generality of HQ’s control system, HQ’s unique competence, identical control structure and communication channel between HQ and subsidiary, social pressures for equal treatment, and HQ-level inertia, that result in the uniform control. I further discussed how each factor influences HQ’s uniform control of subsidiaries. Although limited in generalization, owing to its focus on one firm, this study represents a comprehensive approach to research on subsidiary control within a MNC. The result indicated that HQ controls subsidiaries with different characteristics in a uniform way, which is contrary to the widely-accepted differentiated fit approach. Further, this study identified a variety of factors inhibiting differentiated control. I advocate more research concerning the causes of uniform control. These issues could be best addressed through multiple cases research.