공공기술용역 발주제도의 비효율성: 사업수행능력평가 등 입낙찰제도에 대한 사례연구

There are two procurement regimes for public engineering services. 1) Developed countries employ a ‘flexible’ regime in which a procurer can exercise discretion to select a competent consultant. A flexible regime is permissible only in a procurement environment in which agency problems of a procurer is effectively dealt with. 2) When the World Bank (WB) procures a project for a borrowing country, there is a severe agency problem since the WB cannot directly manage the procurement contract. The WB has to employ a ‘strict’ regime to control ‘double agency problem’ due to delegating the contract management to another agent, the borrowing agency.Since there is no double agency problem in the case of public engineering service procurement in Korea, one should be able to obtain the efficiency of a flexible public procurement regime. Korea, however employs a strict system due to the absence of an effective procurement environment. The current study explicates the regime in Korea is stricter than that of the World Bank in terms of selection of consultant, negotiation and pricing, and is particularly ineffective for selecting a competent consultant. An analysis based on actual data also shows that the regime is ineffective for both competent consultant selection and pricing efficiency.