기업지배구조가 경영자의 이익조정과 기업성과에 미치는 영향

The primary objective of this study is to examine whether earnings management, which may represent managerial transparency, is abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax corporate governance structures or used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient shareholder value－maximization. Prior research provides evidence that earnings management by managers are associated with poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of latitude in accounting rules. In particular, we investigate whether poor governance quality is associated with earnings management and whether firms with weaker governance structures show poorer firm performance as consequence. Our empirical results show that this interpretation may be not conclusive and premature because we fail to observe subsequent loss in related firm performance. Thus we conclude that corporate governance is associated with earnings management by managers but managers may not abuse earnings management at the expense of shareholders wealth.