민주화 이후 한국의 교섭단체제도와 정당경쟁

The major goal of this article is analysis of the effect of negotiation bodyinstitution on party competition structure in Korea. This institution changes balance of party politics different from first balance point of legislative politics like election institutions in electoral politics. All legislative politics except Constitution Congress have adopted negotiation body institution in Korea. Its main property is agenda-setting power, which are management power and agenda control power in plenary sessions and committees. Management power consists of decision power to opening and closure of meeting, non-opening to audience except members and so on. Agenda control power includes additions and changes of agenda, inquiries and speaking of members etc. Negotiation body parties have governed legislative politics through these kinds of power. On the other hand, parties and members of non-negotiation bodies are subject- ed to negotiation body, which can not approach to main locus of legislative politics. These differences between them can be revealed in speakings and party membership changes of non-negotiation members. Particularly, speaking members of non-negotiation party had been one of negotiation body before or after speaking. It means that agenda-setting power of negotiation body influ- ences on legislative activity of each member. Through its analysis, this article argues to reform party competition structure for proportional representation of each vote in legislative politics.