국제통화법과 거시경제정책 조정

International Monetary Law and Macroeconomic Coordination Ju, Jin-Yul* The ultimate purpose of international monetary law is to promote and maintain high levels of both employment and real income through exchange rates stability. In order to achieve this objective, the provisions of the current IMF Agreement, unlike the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement, recognize the right of members to freely choose the exchange arrangements instead of the par value system. However, since 1978, when the floating exchange rate was officially recognized, the stability of the exchange rate, which international monetary law aims to bring about, has not been realized. Beggar-thy-neighbour policy has reappeared since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The policy has been identified as the major factor behind the instability of the exchange rate. The excessive instability of the exchange rate resulting from the beggar-thy-neighbour policy and short-term speculative capital, raises the question of whether the par value system should be implemented or not. However, to the extent that short-term speculative capital is present, the par value system cannot adequately guarantee exchange rates stability. Furthermore, the excessive instability of the exchange rate due to the aforementioned beggar-thy-neighbour policy and the movement of short-term speculative capital cannot be effectively resolved by means of the present norms relating to exchange rate stabilization, such as the IMF surveillance and member countries’ obligations of collaboration. In order to achieve exchange rates stability, which is after all the central aim of the international monetary system, it would appear that international macroeconomic policy coordination is necessary. However, despite the fact that international policy coordination would promote the welfare of nations, it seems that various preliminary problems would render the systematic guarantee of such policy coordination somewhat difficult. Accordingly, international negotiations are required in order to resolve these preliminary problems prior to the systematic guarantee of international macroeconomic policy coordination.