한국 농작물보험시장의 역선택 실증

In this paper, we analyzed empirically evidence and factors of adverse selection, and fairness of rates in the Korean crop insurance market. Empirical analysis indicates that high-risk farmers are 8 times or 33 times more likely to insure with higher amounts than low-risk farmers. The factors that give influence on adverse selection are farm's unit-productivity and loss frequency variables which are statistically significant. But, the factor of farmer's income level shows different results in 2005 and 2006 business year, respectively. In summary, the less productive and/or more frequent farmers are more likely to insure with higher amounts and have higher possibility of adverse selection. In addition, we can find that insurers rate making against the adverse selection is appropriate. In spite of that, the adverse selection in the markets is still existed in a large scale. That means insurers need to make additional efforts to solve the problem. Therefore, we offer several additional alternatives. Those are to manage high-risk farmers intensively, to determine insured amount flexibly, to add loss risk to rate factor, to magnify meritdemerit range according to farmer's insurance experience records, and to build a periodic system of testing adverse selection in crop insurance markets. And we request that crop insurers collect farmer's actual yield data, which are necessary to measure farmer's productivity, to decide insured amount and loss occurrence possibility, and to test adverse selection.