지배주주의 지배-소유권 차이와 이익조정의 관련성 분석

The objective of this paper is to examine how the threat of expropriation by ultimate owners affects earnings management and auditing quality. The ultimate owners typically have control over firms considerably in excess of their cash flow rights. This is so, in part, because they often control firms through pyramidal structures, and in part because they mange the firms they control. Accordingly, the ultimate owners’ incentives to expropriate minority shareholders increase as the separation of their cash flow and voting control rights becomes larger. This is because larger voting rights give the ultimate owners more power to expropriate their companies, while smaller cash flow rights reduce the owners’ share of losses from the extraction of wealth.As our definition of ownership relies on both cash flow and voting control rights, the cash flow rights that support the control by ultimate owners need to be further identified. Firm-specific information on pyramid structures and cross- holdings are used to make the distinction between cash flow and voting rights.We find that the threat of expropriation by ultimate owners have a positive effect on earnings management as measured by accruals. Our results also show that the agency problem associated with ultimate owners have a negative impact on earnings management.