예금보험제도하의 생명보험 시장규율

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the market discipline in the life insurance with deposit insurance, with analysing empirically the interaction among deposit insurance, fundamental variables of life insurers, market discipline by customers, and macroeconomic variables, and to obtain policy implication of the result. For this purpose the techniques of co-integration, error-correction model, impulse response functions and decomposition of variance for a VAR model are used in the empirical analysis. It employs monthly data of variables covering the period of 1998 - 2005. To sum up major highlights of the analytical results, the results of estimation are statistically significant and effectively explain the following. First, market discipline by the insured is at work in the life insurance. Second, explicit deposit insurance does not tend to increase the likelihood of life insurer insolvencies. Third, deposit insurance tends to reduce the incentives of the insured to monitor and discipline their insurers, but does not tend to increase the incentives of insurers for excessive risk taking. In particular, the insured(depositors) tend to discipline their insurers by withdrawing their deposits or increasing the lapse ratio when they perceive insurer's excessive risk taking.Therefore we should consider and practice various schemes to vitalize the efficiency of deposit insurance in the process of life insurnce's growth and market discipline, such as circumspective application of method estimating credit risk, transparent disclosure of information about insurer's management, financial supervisor's noblesse oblige.