페널티함수를 통한 2단계 공급사슬에서의 리드타임 감축방안에 관한 연구

Recently many firms pay attention to the effective supply chain management, and they are endeavoring to improve competitiveness of supply chains in which they are participating. Through such process, it is widely recognized that lead time reduction plays a critical role in enhancing supply chain performance. In reviewing relevant literature dealing with supply chain lead time issues, we can identify three typical categories of alternatives proposed: order splitting among multiple vendors, quantity discounts or early commitment through price reduction, and direct and joint investments on lead time reduction. This study falls in the second category in the sense that we proposed a mechanism to induce coordinations among channel participants. However, we assumed that each channel participant acts as an independent economic agent and they are seeking to maximize their respective profits, i.e., Stackelberg game environment. Specifically, in a two-echelon supply chain, we derived respective cost functions considering penalty factor. Using the cost functions, we showed the existence of equilibrium in Stackelberg game, and we proposed a penalty function to adjust the equilibrium to reduce lead time and optimize channel profit, i.e., an optimal penalty function. Finally, we tested the sensitivity of the optimal penalty function according to the various level of relative lead time between warehouse's lead time and retailer's lead time.