중국 상장기업의 소유구조와 수익성에 관한 연구

The relations between shareholding structure and profitability measures for 397 firms in China were examined. The samples were consisted of all firms listed in the Shanghai & Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2002. The following terms were used for empirical study: return on equity as dependent variables, firm size, region, and ownership structure as control variables.This study found that profitability is positively related to the proportion of low level of equity ownership but negative related to proportion of share owned by the state. Additional analyses indicate that firm performance increase with the degree of relative dominance of non-state shares over state shares. The empirical evidence presented here suggests the inefficiency of state ownership. It caused that the government many pursue political objectives such as excess employment rather than profit maximization. Many studies also point out that conflicts between the government's and shareholders' goals are a source of inefficiency. The inefficiency of state ownership many arise from a series of principal-agent problems. The manager from the government may not have sufficient incentives to preserve and increase the value of state properties. The market-oriented reform measures that China has adopted seem to have improved the economic efficiency of the state sector. However, optimal resource allocation is unlikely to be achieved simply by creating market for products, workers, and mangers without changing the ownership structure of SOEs. These finding suggest that corporealization and privatization has created a regime conductive to implementing measures for state-owned firm's reform in China's economic transition.