참여예산 하에서 상대적 성과평가정보의 효율성에 관한 실험 연구

This paper aims to suggest the efficiency of relative performance evaluation information. I first reviewed the profit-sharing incentive pay scheme, Groves pay scheme and relative performance evaluation pay scheme. To test the budgetary slack, the experimental design is used. The major results of this study are as follows. First, relative performance evaluation information had strong incentive as a truthful reporting factor as well as higher effort level. This result extends the study of Frederickson(1992) which suggests that under common uncertainty the relative performance evaluation pay scheme' effort level was higher than other incentive pay schemes. Second, the researching result that a reported rate of return has some patterns according to a predicted rate of return has significant meaning in the behavioral science because it is possible to predict behavioral patterns of agents when they participate in budget-settings. The contributions of this study are as follows. First, This paper suggest that relative performance evaluation incentive pay scheme including a factor of competition has the most powerful effect as truth inducing pay scheme under participative budget. This result has a great meaning that it theoretically backup the compensation system that discussed and introduced by each company actively in the recent times and presents figure of desirable system. Second, The result that reported rate of return has regular pattern according to a expected return of rate is very meaningful in the field of the behavior science because it can predict representative behavior pattern will take according to expected rate of return.