No Child Left Behind Act 의 헌법적 기초- 세출조항 適用上의 위헌성 논란을 중심으로 -

The No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLBA") is a monumental revision to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA"), and is expected to result in fundamental reforms in education throughout the United States of America. The main provisions of NCLBA seek stronger accountability for results, expanded flexibility and local control, expanded options for parents, and an emphasis on teaching methods that have been proven to work. As a result, school districts and states have specific obligations under NCLBA to schools, parents, and students. The new parental notification and choice provisions implement a market-based reform strategy. In this paper it is argued that, in light of NCLBA, if there is a possibility that the U. S. Supreme Court revives Spending Clause precedent ("coercion test" articulated in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis) that has lain dormant for almost seventy years in order to better define the limitations on the Congress's power to offer financial incentives in exchange for state cooperation in implementing federal programs. The heart of the issues discussed in this paper is whether the friction created by school's compliance with NCLBA's demands provides the Supreme Court with the requisite facts to restore the "coercion test", thereby strengthening the limitations of the current spending doctrine under the U. S. Constitution. First of all, this paper attempts to trace the history and impact of NCLBA. Again, NCLBA amends the 1965 ESEA. TitleⅠof the ESEA pledges federal funds to assist state and local educational systems in addressing the needs of low-income and socially disadvantaged students. ESEA targeted only "TitleⅠschools," defined as low-income student-populated schools. TitleⅠmonies are not intended to replace local sources of revenue for education. Congress annually allocates the TitleⅠfunds, and every five to six years reauthorizes the ESEA. In the second place, I tried to outline Congress's Spending Clause power as articulated by the Supreme Court. Specifically, my argument focuses on the Court's opinion in South Dakota v. Dole, which examined and upheld a conditional spending program and enumerated four guidelines that limit Congress's spending power under ArticleⅠ, Section 8 of the U. S. Constitution. Lastly, using the test established in Dole case, I explain why the Supreme Court would uphold NCLBA against a Spending Clause challenge despite some persuasive arguments that could be made against the program. On the assumption that NCLBA survives scrutiny under the current Spending Clause doctrine, I advocate the need for the Supreme Court to revive its "coercion test" analysis in order to create effective limits on congressional spending authority. Despite NCLBA's alleged shortcomings and some commentators' claim that NCLBA is unconstitutional, I'd like to say, to conclude, it appears that NCLBA is there to stay for the time being.