토마스 아퀴나스의 윤리적 양심론

This thesis aims to answer the following questions with relation to the concept and function of moral conscience according to Thomas Aquinas. What is conscience? What are the fundamental functions of it? How can we explain the double structure of that from which evil and good come? Is the judgment of moral conscience obligatory, including that of erroneous one, why is it? Which is prior, reason or liberty? Is conscience sufficient for moral life? What to do with prudence does it have? This has investigated those problems from the points of view of the nature of the moral conscience and the cognitive structure of moral conscience, the relation of conscience to prudence, the obligation of conscience, the relation of conscience to truth and liberty, which Thomas Aquinas says about. The results that I have ascertained are as follows. Firstly, the cognitive structure of conscience is known through the distinction between synderesis and conscience, both of which belong to practical reason. Synderesis is a habit of prime operative principles that pronounces the universal judgments on the acts to be done. Synderesis cannot be extinguishable simply but solely secundum quid, namely, in case of exercise of it through the lack of the use of reason. On the other hand, conscience is principally an act of judgment applying the universal knowledge to a particular act, integrally including psychological act like to witness to the human life, and the moral acts like to bind, or incite, and to excuse, accuse, torment, or rebuke. Conscience as quasi regula regulata can err except in the particular conclusions that are directly subsumed under the universal principles of synderesis. Moral conscience applies the habits of the operative reason: synderesis, wisdom and the science in the antecedent and consequent manners. In this way the moral conscience is extended to the whole life of human being from the present, the past and to the future. Secondly, the judgments of conscience and of prudence are the same one judgment considered according to different aspects. The judgment, considered precisely as proceeding from synderesis and thus assuring the rectitude of an act to be posed but not controlling the appetitive potency, is that of conscience. This judgment, considered as it attains the singular operable, and guaranteeing its practical rectitude by being conformed to the inclination of rectified appetite, is the judgment of prudence, or more precisely, of synesis and gnome. When the judgment of conscience is thus formed within the judgment of prudence, its insufficiency is eliminated and virtuous acts are assured. Thirdly, Conscience has a binding force in virtue of the knowledge of the divine precept, in the sense that if one does not follow it, he commits a sin. Furthermore, Thomas applies the principle of the binding force of conscience to the erroneous one. The reason is that the will is evil, when it wills evil. Invincible ignorance can, by making an act involuntary, can exempt the will following the command of erroneous conscience from evil. But although even erroneous conscience can have a binding force, it binds in different way from right conscience. The right conscience binds absolutely, while the erroneous conscience binds under condition. Although it excuses the will from evil to abide by erroneous conscience which arise from invincilble ignorance, nevertheless it is not good, because good comes from the entire, while evil from each particular defect. Fourthly, conscience is said to be the privileged place of the real meeting between liberty and truth. The union of liberty with truth becomes real only when man knows truth, chooses and loves it, lives in conformity with it. The human dignity is in the knowledge of truth and in the love of it. Nevertheless, nobody can be compelled to accept the truth of faith and to love the good without his own conviction and willingness induced by his conscience. The liberty of conscience has creative characteristics. But it is not in creating truth itself from nothing, but is properly in perceiving the will of God and putting it in practice in mobile situation of history. Conscience in front of positive precept is an active element in the moral life, while conscience in front of negative precept can not refer to the law of graduality. In brief, the most notable characteristics of the moral conscience theory according to Thomas Aquinas are in that it emphasizes intensely and consistently the dependency of conscience and the morality of man on the absolute truth, the attribution of conscience to the practical reason, and the necessity of the understanding of conscience within prudence. The fundamental ideas of this theory are not contrary to the Bible and the Magisterium of Catholic Church today.