금융기관의 불량고객관리 전략 연구 : 구전 및 경쟁의 효과

This paper explores the effects of word-of-mouth (WOM) on the payoffs of financial institutions where bad-credit customers can be refinanced even after the credibility of customers has become known poor and after thus initial lending has become unsuccessful. Financial institutions make all efforts to avoid bad financing by strengthening their lending criteria and screening process before their lending decisions are made, and by monitoring customers for the outstanding loans. A dilemma or a puzzle arises when refinancing to bad-credit customers is financially due to the initial loans which have become sunk at the time of decision making related to refinancing. For this, we introduce the effect of WOM on the financial market in a multi-period game setup that Kim (2003) used to explain how such customers can be strategically rejected in refinancing, otherwise rationally refinanced due to the positive net present value after the initial lending become sunk in the following periods. In this setup, customers and financial institutions can change their strategies in each period, in a market where many types of competitiors coexist. We also explore how the payoffs of financial institutions change when customers try to maximize their benefits, when different or same strategies are adopted by competitors, where different portions of such customers exist, and when some portion of customers have become known the strategies of the financial institutions through experiences or through efforts of getting information available. In this paper, we show that competition among financial institutions can more effectively lead to a tough decision against bad-credit customers as a Nash equilibrium than a monopolistic financial regime, due to the effects of WOM among customers on the strategies and payoffs of financial institutions. In the model, a financial institution can either refinance or reject refinancing bad-credit customers even at the costs of lower profits in the current period. The Nash equilibrium can exist where competitors are all refinancing bed-credit customers or where they all reject such financing. We show that deviations from the optimal strategies over time are not strategically sustainable in the long run. We also show whether refinancing proves to be a better strategy depending on the payoffs and strategies of lenders, distributions of customers, and effects of WOM. The effects of WOM can increase the likelihood of tough decisions by financial institutions to bad-credit customers, thus discouraging them to apply for refinancing in the following periods. The effects of WOM can also increase with a higher number of competitors, with a larger portion of WOM customers with information about the strategies of financial institutions, and with a lower adverse effect in current-period payoffs. Although tough decisions are optimal for financial institutions or economies when repeated financing to poor credit customers are problematic, refinancing can be justified as well when sufficient payoffs are obtainable through risk premiums, etc.