수직결합과 경쟁제한성 판단 - 봉쇄효과를 중심으로 -
Vertical mergers and competitive effect analysis
곽상현(춘천지방법원)
102호, 65~100쪽
초록
수직결합은 종전에 분리된 두 회사 사이의 거래를 결합을 통하여 내부화함에 따라 효율성을 창출할 수 있는 결합의 한 형태라 할 수 있다. 그러나 그러한 결합으로 인하여 효율성과 같은 경쟁촉진적인 효과만 발생되는 것이 아니라 경우에 따라서는 원재료나 판매망을 장악함에 따라 경쟁자를 경쟁의 장에서 몰아내는 것과 같은 경쟁저해적인 효과가 발생할 수 있다는 점에 관하여는 특별히 다른 견해가 존재하지 아니하는 것으로 보인다. 그런데 미국에서도 수직결합의 경우 수평결합과는 달리 경쟁제한성의 판단 기준에 관하여 통일된 이론이 정립되지 못한 상태이고, 우리의 경우에도 이에 관하여 특별히 논의되는 것은 없어 보인다. 따라서 이 논문에서는 이러한 점에 착안하여 먼저 수직결합의 효율성에 관하여 살펴보고 그 동안 미국에서 수직결합 규제에 관한 역사적 배경을 살펴본 다음, 한때 완전히 폐기된 이론으로 알려진 봉쇄효과에 관한 새로운 시각을 제공하는 포스트 시카고학파의 입장에 따라 수직결합의 경쟁제한성 판단 기준을 살펴보며, 아울러 봉쇄효과를 받아들이고 있는 공정거래위원회의 심사기준의 내용과 문제점을 간단히 살펴보기로 한다.
Abstract
Vertical integration by merger does not reduce the total number of economic entities operating at one level of the market, but it may change patterns of industry behavior. Whichever direction (upstream or downstream) a vertical merger takes, the newly acquired firm may decide to deal only with the acquiring firm, thereby altering competition in three markets: among the acquiring firm's suppliers, customers, or competitors. The adjustment toward greater reliance on internal transfers is unremarkable; if efficiencies can be gained from internalization, one would expect the newly integrated firm to resort more to internal transfers and to rely less on open market transactions. However, not all market participants may regard a switch to fewer outside purchases favorably. Suppliers may lose a market for their goods, retail outlets may be deprived of supplies, and competitors may find that both supplies and outlets are blocked. This phenomenon raises the same concern that attends antitrust analysis of vertical contractual restraints-the possibility that vertical integration will foreclose competitors by limiting their access to sources of supply or to customers. But the foreclosure theory of competitive harm also has attracted extensive criticism. Economists emphasize that the foreclosure hypothesis mistakenly assumes that internalization from a vertical merger completely shields internal transfers from the discipline of market forces. Vertically integrated firms ordinarily will buy products from related companies only if they offer a quality and price superior to that attainable through external transfers. Despite the criticism directed at traditional foreclosure theory, it remains a valid antitrust concern when the degree of foreclosure in an upstream or downstream market is substantial. A number of supplementary or additional theories provide explanations as to how a vertical merger that involves a substantial percentage of an upstream or downstream market may give rise to anticompetitive injury: (1) the merger may facilitate price discrimination that raises rival's costs; (2) the merger may facilitate cooperative interaction or collusion at the upstream or downstream levels; (3) the merger may allow a regulated entity to evade regulation; or (4) the merger may force potential entrants to make a difficult, dual-level entry. After reviewing traditional foreclosure theory, each of these variations are described below.
- 발행기관:
- 한국법학원
- 분류:
- 기타법학