내부와 외부의 대주주가 이사회 구조에 미치는 영향 : 외환위기이후의 한국기업의 분석

Since outside director was introduced in Korean companies ten years ago, the impact of outside director on corporate performance has not been studied sufficiently. This paper investigated the role of inside and outside large shareholders in introducing outside directors. These large shareholders were analyzed as the determinants of board structure. Because most of Korean companies have concentrated ownership structure, the agency problem in Korean companies exists between controlling shareholder and outside minority shareholders. I hypothesized the negative relationship between ownership rate of controlling shareholder and the ratio of outsiders in the board and insignificant relationship between managerial ownership and board ratio. In addition, I assumed that institutional investor ownership rate and foreign investor ownership rate have the positive relationship with board ratio. The ownership rate of controlling shareholder is also divided to family ownership rate and affiliate ownership rate. The hypotheses were tested from the data of Korean manufacturing companies listed in stock exchange in 2002 and 2003 and most of them were accepted. This paper contributed to analyze the process of board reform in Korean companies after the currency crisis.