국제민간항공협약의 “표준 및 권고관행”의 실효성 제고를 위한 국제적 동향과 전망

The Status of the Annexes of the Convention is governed by Articles 37 and 38 of the Convention. These Provisions clarify that the Annexes do not have the same legally binding force as the articles of the main body of the Convention. One reason is that they are not subject to ratification and that they are a form of technical international legislation. In the practice of ICAO, international standards have been clearly distinguished from recommended practice. While the main body of each of the 18 Annexes will typically consist of international standards, any paragraphs of text which have the status of a recommended practice will be clearly and visibly set out as such through an appropriate print image. While standards are shown as consecutive paragraphs in normal print, recommended practices are usually designated as such and printed in italics. The objective of The ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme(USOAP) which was launched on 1 January 1999, is to promote global aviation safety through auditing Contracting States, The scope of the Programme was initially limited to Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing, Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft and Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft. In 2005, The Assembly resolved that the Programme be expanded to cover the safety-related provisions in all safety-related Annexes and also to implement a comprehensive systems approach for the conduct of safety oversight audits. ICAO also established the Universal Security Audit Programme in 2002 with the objective of promoting global aviation security through the auditing of all ICAO member States on a regular basis to determine the status of implementation of ICAO's Annex 17 Standards. Modern “open skies” bilateral agreement such as Korea-U.S. air transport agreement repeats reciprocal recognition clause of Article 33 of the Convention, It further provides that either state may request consultations concerning the aviation safety standards maintained by the other. Following such consultations, should one state conclude that the other does not maintain safety standards at least as stringent as those required under the Chicago Convention and its Annexes, the other state shall be notified of the deficiency and the steps necessary to cure it. The state must then take appropriate corrective action. In the event the other state fails to take such action in a reasonable time, the state concerned about the deficiency may "withhold, revoke, suspend, or limit the operating authorization or technical permission" of the other's flag-carriers.