지배주주지분변화의 사전공시 필요성

This study investigates the relationship between controlling shareholder’s equity holding changes and long-term performance(operation, stock) after the changes and verifies whether controlling shareholders promote their own economic benefits through the timing they trade in their own stock. For a reduction of information asymmetry between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, this paper suggests a necessity of ex-ante disclosure of controlling shareholder’s equity holdings changes. In most korean firms, controlling shareholders directly or indirectly have a voice in the management or have an influence on the management and are superior to minority shareholders in the information accessibility of a future performance of the firms. So controlling shareholders have strong incentives to promote their own economic benefits with the advantage of inside information. Using a sample of large trades by controlling shareholders between 1995 and 2004 in The Korea Exchange market, this study examined the relationship between the post- trading-period abnormal returns and controlling owner trading. The result is that controlling owner trading is positively related to the post-trading-period abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with the argument that controlling shareholders promote their own economic benefits with the advantage of inside information. this paper finds the fact that controlling shareholders promote their own economic benefits through the timing they trade in their own stock, provides evidence that controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders, and suggests the complement for the weak points in a capital market rules.