How to Deal With Complex Economic Evidence in Korean Antitrust Litigation
How to Deal With Complex Economic Evidence in Korean Antitrust Litigation
주진열(부산대학교)
5권 1호, 141~167쪽
초록
Economic evidence is highly valuable in complex and empirical antirust issues. However, it should be noted that the use of econometric technique is accompanied by the risk of its misuse. As lay judges can hardly understand the cognitive aims and methods of economics, they are prone to make an error in evaluating the competing complex econometric evidences. To avoid misleading decision in antitrust cases involving the competing complex economic evidences, judges need to actively use court-appointed expert witness and/or special expert commissioner under articles 164-2 and 335 of the Civil Procedure Act. In trial practice, however, when the parties do not agree on the use of expert witness, it is not easy for judges to appoint expert witness at its own discretion. Facing the hard antitrust case, judges need to direct the parties to agree on the use of a well-qualified, neutral economic expert witness. When the parties are reluctant to use expert witness because of the cost of expert witness, judges may consider the use of special expert commissioner. Because the courts pay the cost of special expert commissioner, the parties may feel free to agree on the use of special commissioner. The use of a panel of experts will be more helpful than a sole special expert commissioner. The one report from the panel based on consensus among members is likely to provide an intellectually systemic, coherent advice to address and resolve two competing economic evidences.
Abstract
Economic evidence is highly valuable in complex and empirical antirust issues. However, it should be noted that the use of econometric technique is accompanied by the risk of its misuse. As lay judges can hardly understand the cognitive aims and methods of economics, they are prone to make an error in evaluating the competing complex econometric evidences. To avoid misleading decision in antitrust cases involving the competing complex economic evidences, judges need to actively use court-appointed expert witness and/or special expert commissioner under articles 164-2 and 335 of the Civil Procedure Act. In trial practice, however, when the parties do not agree on the use of expert witness, it is not easy for judges to appoint expert witness at its own discretion. Facing the hard antitrust case, judges need to direct the parties to agree on the use of a well-qualified, neutral economic expert witness. When the parties are reluctant to use expert witness because of the cost of expert witness, judges may consider the use of special expert commissioner. Because the courts pay the cost of special expert commissioner, the parties may feel free to agree on the use of special commissioner. The use of a panel of experts will be more helpful than a sole special expert commissioner. The one report from the panel based on consensus among members is likely to provide an intellectually systemic, coherent advice to address and resolve two competing economic evidences.
- 발행기관:
- 한국법경제학회
- 분류:
- 법경제학