은행의 소유지배구조가 경영자보상구조에 미치는 영향

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how Korean Banks' ownership and governance structures affect executives' compensation structure. The main characteristics of ownership and governance structures scrutinized under this study are :1) the extent of share holding by the management, 2)the degree of ownership concentration, 3) the extent of share holdings by the foreign investors and 4) the rating of effective corporate governance by CGS. The significance of executives' compensation structure defined under this study are : 1)the award of executives' stock option, 2) the type of executive stock option, and 3) the relative value of stock options in the executives' total compensation package. Our empirical analysis shows that the significance of executives' incentive decreases as the extent of share holdings by the major owner and the management increases. This support the argument claiming that the conflict of interests between shareholders and the management is diminished when share holdings by the management increases and the major owner performing the monitoring function. The analysis also reveals that increasing of executives' incentives become more significant as the extent of share holdings by foreign investors. This result is consistent with the idea that outside block holders do function effectively as external monitors. Also. the effectiveness of corporate governance significantly affects the executives' compensation structure. This result is consistent with the idea that inside and outside control mechanism do function effectively. In summary, the empirical evidence is consistent with the view that the ownership and governance structures play a important role in determining the overall extent of executives' incentive compensation in Korean banks.