독립규제위원회의 전문성 제고를 위한 시스템에 관한 연구 - 방송통신위원회의 기능과 역할을 중심으로 -

The “independent” agency is independent if Congress has provided that its members can be discharged by the President only for specified causes. If Congress has so provided, it is ordinarily understood that the President cannot discharge independent commissioners simply because he disagrees with their views, and that his supervisory authority is sharply limited. The paradox at issue here is one of institutional design rather than substantive regulatory policy. The argument for the independent agency stems largely from a belief in the need for expert, apolitical, and technically sophisticated administration of the laws. Even if independent agencies achieved this end, one might question the goal itself. Independent agencies often must make important judgments of policy and principle, and on those judgments expertise is never decisive. Consider, for example, the judgment of the KCC about whether licensees are obliged to present programming on public issues, or whether diversity on the basis of race or sex counts in favor of an applicant for a license. None of these policies is based solely on technocratic judgments, and so may properly belong in the political rather than the regulatory sphere. But even if one accepts the premise that political independence is necessary, the fact is that independent agencies are not independent at all. Indeed, such agencies are highly responsive to shifts in political opinion and even to the views of the President. But the problem is even worse than that. The independent agencies have generally been highly susceptible to the political pressure of well-organized private groups-perhaps even more susceptible, on balance, than executive agencies. Many of the most egregious illustrations of agency vulnerability to pressure groups can be found in precisely this area. Thus the KCC has been dominated by the communications industry. Far from acting as disinterested experts, independent administrators often are, in practice, subject to parochial interests. The regulatory programs have not always succeeded, thus its succession rely on administrative agency's specialty security. So I have discussed comparative study of other agency's system and institutionalization of specialty heightening method of KCC.