지분법회계제도의 이익조정 억제 효과

This study aims to examine whether the equity method system controls earnings management of the investor company or not. This study hypothesizes that the equity method system would control earnings management, especially earnings upward management. For the study, the sample consists of three groups ; 1,832 firm-year data before the enforcement of the equity method system, 3,353 firm-year data using the equity method system, and 1,432 firm-year data not using the equity method system during enforced period. The years of the sample range from 1995 through 2007. In estimating the discretionary accruals, the study uses performance-matched model(Kothari et al. 2005). With the tests of the absolute value of discretionary accruals(DA), the study confirms that the equity method system significantly controls earnings management. And the tests of DA says that the equity method system significantly controls earnings upward management. After controlling the firm character variables, would the equity method system still control the earnings upward management? Firm character variables such as total assets(LASS), debts to total assets ratio(LEV), cash from operations divided by total assets(CFO), and the equity method system(EQU) are used in the test. The multiple regression analysis shows that the equity method system significantly controls the earnings upward management. And with the year-by-year tests, the coefficient of the EQU is significantly negative, which means that the equity method system has control effects on earnings upward management. The yearly results of 2003 and 2007 are significantly negative. So I can conclude that the equity method system has controlling effects on earnings management, furthermore on earnings upward management. And the above mentioned results can be observed since 2003.