시스템 제품의 호환성과 연구개발 유인에 대한 연구

In many system markets, compatibility between different components and its effect on innovation is an important issue not only for firms but also for a social planner. In this paper, we examine the effect of compatibility on firms' R&D incentives. Especially, by allowing firms to change the market structure, we provide a view over the recent change of the market structure of high-tech industries. We also find some policy implications. We consider a system market where one component is homogeneous and the other horizontally differentiated. We find that R&D incentives are larger when components made by different providers are compatible with each other. If the cost of innovation is small enough, firms can enjoy the benefit of innovation by making their components compatible with those of their rival. In contrast, firms may prefer incompatibility which allows them to avoid R&D competition when the R&D cost is large. In that case, firms out-source one of their components which are incompatible with those of their rival. According to a recent observation, there has been a tendency toward technological integration and less vertical integration. We find this prevailing market structure of high-tech industries may be welfare reducing by undermining innovation incentives.