영업사원 교육훈련 모델에 관한 연구

The authors studies salesperson training models using game theory. A lot of salesperson training programs often fail in the competitive market because most firms lay too much emphasis on short term performance such as sales, profitability, etc. The primary purpose of this study is to draw long term equilibrium based on the market responses for salesperson training. Most firms usually invest much in training to get highly-qualified salesperson. But the results of most training have shown negative effects as well as positive effects. One of the negative effects is an increase in sales force turnover. In that contest, additional purposes of this study is to analyze the dilemma of training program, and to provide optimal training strategy for firms in the competitive business environment. The authors have developed quantitative theoretical model applying game theory to explain the market phenomenon and to find a long term market equilibrium. The results of this study show that training costs in the monopolistic industry are likely to be sunk and that training will fail if a firm does not provide differentiated incentives to salespersons who are well trained before joining the firm than those trained after joining. And a more generalized model for the competitive market also shows the same results.