해양레짐의 관점에서 본 PSI의 실행 과제

A heated maritime security issue on the Korean Peninsula concerns the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.led global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The South Korean government decided to fully participate in the PSI in the wake of a nuclear test by North Korea, on May 25, 2009. However, South Korea confirmed that the Agreement on Maritime Transportation between the South and the North would remain valid. The South Korean government had wavered on fully joining the PSI given the volatile and unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government stuck to its position that while it supported the PSI, it would not join on the grounds that full participation might provoke a military conflict with North Korea and that joining the PSI did not match with South Korea's engagement policy toward the North. Most importantly, the South Korean government referred to the Agreement of Maritime Transportbetween the South and the North noting that the Agreement would bring the same effects as joining the PSI. Whether thePSI is consistent with ocean regimes under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is a moot point. Despite the PSI has contributed to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), some criticism has been raised with respect to the legality and legitimacy of the PSI. The criticism is primarily focused on the point that the PSI, a global effort involving the use of forces to prevent the illicit trafficking of WMD, was formulated outside the UN framework. Of particular concern in terms of the implementation of the PSI at sea in this regard concerns how to make it consistent with fundamental regimes under international law such as innocent passage and freedom of navigation in the high sea and the rights of flag state.