국지최적화 생산시장에서의 권력-정보 특성

The market is often portrayed as the playground for individual actors who seek higher profit but never use power on other actors at all. To this folk image of power-free market, economic sociology has consistently opposed with numerous research findings that show the market is full of social factors such as social relation, culture, social cognition, institutions, and power. One of the most visible and systematic research findings on the market from the sociological point of view is Harrison White’s production market theory. Though his theory of production market shares with other findings a consistent and focused emphasis on the social relational dimensions that are always operative in the market, his work is distinct from other sociological research because of the systematic presentation with a lucid mathematical model. The formal presentation makes the essential traits of the market model clear and coherent, allowing well-illuminated investigations of the theory and providing with useful tools to extend or develop his theory. Drawing on the advantages of his work, this paper critically examines the production market theory and model in order to show that his theory of market is based on a certain power characteristics and information regime, though he did not clarify the central assumptions. The second purpose is to show that the power and information characteristics are integrated with the very base of the market by indicating that the change in the power and information-related characteristics of the production market necessarily bring about variation of market performance of the producers and the consumers. Last, this paper also intends to introduce the sociological theory of the production market, which has not been widely recognized or discussed in Korea. The Production Market Theory, A Sociological Point of View According to White, the production market is a social structure, where producers are deeply embedded in the flow of resource and cognition, and are given their locus by structural equi- valence with other producers, solve the problem of information uncertainty by paying attention to the signals flowing out from the whole array of producers with different quality indices. The array is actually the market schedule which the structurally equivalent producers have historically maintained for years or decades. The market schedule is socially constructed by the multiple producers who have different quality indices and thus different production volumes in the past. Every producer in the market expects other producers to maintain the quality and production volume position, and also are expected to do the same. In this sense, the production market is a role structure. Based on the institutional ground, the producers maximize profit by choosing proper production volume. On the other hand, the consumers are modelled as an aggregate who know the value of each producer’s product, compare globally all the producers’ ratios of value to expenditure, and demand the ratio to be the same, though they cannot optimize the value locally, i. e. near the production volume of the previous period which is determined by the producer’s quality index. Power and Information-Related Characteristics of the Market Harrison White has not theorized the power and information-related characteristics of the different market strategies of the producers and the consumers. However, a careful investigation clearly shows that the different market strategies of the actors are result of the actors’ power and information-related positions. To theorize this aspect, this paper classifies the market strategies into local optimization and global comparison. Producers optimize their behavior, but only locally. Consumers can compare the value ratios to expenditure globally, or over the whole market, but cannot optimize the ratio locally. In this sense, White’s production market is a pair of local optimization by the producers and global comparison by the consumers. This paper intends to step up into a higher level of generalization of the market mechanism by theorizing market types which are different from White’s market, but comparable due to partially similar characteristics. Building a 2 by 2 table from two market strategies of producers and consumers, this paper identifies four possible market types. White’s market is the type with producer’s local optimization and consumer’s global comparison, i. e. market (2, 1), if I use number indices for producer’s action and consumer’s action. This paper compares the type with another market type where both producers and consumers optimize locally, i. e. market (2, 2). The next job is to examine whether the different strategies yield different market performance to the actors. If the strategies produce different results, it means that the market is deeply intermixed with power and information-related characteristics. The local optimization market, or market (2, 2), which shares with White’s market producers’ local optimization strategy, is shown to have the same profit rate with White’s market, or market (2, 1). The same strategy of the producers produces the same profit rate over the markets. On the other hand, the consumer’s value rate, defined as the ratio of net value-value minus expenditure-to expenditure, is different in the two markets. In the entire parameter space of the market, consumers’ local optimization strategy results in the higher value rate for consumers. This result is highly comparable to other research that examines market (1, 1) where both producers and consumers do global comparison strategy but are unable to optimize locally. In the market, where producers’ employ different strategy, producers’ profit rate is different. Combined together, the research findings show that the producers or consumers’ change of strategies result in different market performance of those on the same side of the production market. Implication to Social Research on the Production Market This paper adopts a mathematical approach to the theory of production market in order to show that the production market is institutionally set with a certain combination of power and information characteristics. The power and information-related characteristics shape the market actors’ strategies and result in different market performance. This is a strong evidence that attests the central importance of power and information. If the market performance appeared invariant under the change of institutional settings with power implication, the result can be a strong testimony to dominant capability of interest-seeking behavior in setting the market. In fact, however, the market performance depends on the power-information characteristics and the actors’ market strategies. Now it can be said that the market is closely integrated with power and information-related feature. This work can be further extended in the future to models of the market as embedded structure and process in institutional attributes.