감사인 강제교체가 감사품질에 미치는 영향
The Effects of Mandatory Auditor Rotation on Audit Quality
노준화(충남대학교)
34권 4호, 1~29쪽
초록
본 연구는 2006년부터 2008년까지에 감사인을 강제교체한 192개의 주권상장법인을 대상으로 감사인의 강제교체제도가 감사품질을 높이는데 기여하였는지를 분석하였다. 감사품질은 다수의 선행연구들에서와 같이 재량적 발생액으로 측정하였으며, 재량적 발생액은 수정된 Jones(1991) 모형과 Kothari et al.(2005) 모형에 따라 측정하였다. 규제기관은 회계법인이 감사할 수 있는 최장 감사기간을 6년으로 제한하는 감사인의 강제교체제도(Mandatoy Audit Firm Rotation)가 감사인의 독립성을 강화하여 감사품질을 향상할 수 있다고 기대하고 2003년 당해 제도를 도입하였다. 만약 규제기관의 입법 취지가 타당하였다면 감사인의 강제교체제도가 도입된 이후 현재의 감사인을 교체하여야 할 것으로 기대되는 기업의 감사인은 독립성을 타협할 유인이 약화될 것이고 따라서 이들 기업의 재량적 발생액(감사품질의 대용치)은 낮아졌을 것이다. 본 연구는 과연 감사인을 강제교체하기로 예정된 기업의 감사품질이 다른 기업(기간)에 비하여 더 높아지는 지를 비교하기 위하여 감사인을 강제교체한 연도로부터 이전 6년과 이후 3년 동안의 재량적 발생액을 비교하였다. 논문접수: 2009. 8. 1차수정: 2009. 10. 게재확정: 2009. 12. * 이 논문은 2006년 LG연암문화재단의 해외교수파견 지원을 받아 수행된 연구입니다. 연구비를 지원해 주신 LG연암문화재단에 깊은 감사를 표하며, 두 익명의 심사자에게도 감사드립니다. ** 충남대학교 회계학과 교수 Chungnam National University, Department of Accounting (E-mail: jhrho@cnu.ac.kr) 분석결과 감사인 강제교체는 재량적 발생액과 유의한 관계를 발견할 수 없었다. 특히 본 연구는 감사인을 강제교체하기 직전 3년 동안의 재량적이 다른 연도(-6년에서 -4년까지, +1년에서 +3년까지)보다 낮은 지를 조사하였지만 유의한 차이를 발견할 수 없었다. 또한 감사인을 강제교체하기 직전 3년 동안의 재량적 발생액이 감사인을 강제교체하지 않은 기업보다 낮은지도 조사하였지만 유의한 차이를 발견할 수 없었다. 이러한 결과는 재량적 발생액의 측정 방법(수정된 Jones(1991)와 Kothari et al.(2005))에 따라 달라지지 않았으며, Big4 감사인 여부에 따라서도 달라지지 않았다. 본 연구는 사후적이지만 우리나라에서 최초로 감사인 강제제도의 도입효과를 검증하였다는 점에서 그 공헌을 찾을 수 있다.
Abstract
This study explores whether Korea’s mandatory auditor rotation regime enforced from 2006 to 2008 improved audit quality. The logic behind Korea’s adopting a mandatory audit rotation regime is that a possible collusion resulting from long term auditor-client relationship could affect auditor independence, and therefore audit quality. While mandatory audit rotation had long been an issue among many advanced countries, accounting scandals involving Enron has made it more urgent. The U.S accounting regulators attribute those accounting scandals to a long-term auditor-client relationship between Enron and its auditor Arther Anderson. The U.S General Accounting Offic, or GAO for short, surveyed the feasibilty of enforcing a mandatory auditor rotation regime when the U.S Congress discussed a law, now known as Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or SOX, to reform accounting practices. On a survey conducted by GAO who asked auditors at top US audit firms, Fortune 1000 company managers and its audit committee chairpersons whether a mandatory audit rotation regime is desirable, most of the respondents said that the cost of enforcing mandatory audit rotation would exceed the benefits from it. (GAO, 2003). Based on these findings, the Securities Exchange Committee, or SEC, chose not to include mandatory audit rotation provisions in SOX. SEC’s decision seems due to its concerns that with little benefit being expected, enforcing a mandatory audit rotation regime could only cause additional costs. As talk went on about the feasibility of mandatory audit rotation in the U.S, Korea reformed the External Audit Act in December, 2003 to include mandatory audit rotation provisions in External Audit Act. But the new mandatory audit rotation provisions had applied to fiscal years starting Jan. 1, 2006 or later until they were abolished in the Feb, 2009 amendment, making Korea’s mandatory audit rotation regime a three-year experiment. As mentioned above, Korea’s mandatory audit rotation regime was introduced when the U.S regulators began to discuss how to regulate auditing practices by law. GAO conducted a survey and, based on the survey findings, decided not to enforce the first mandatory audit rotation regime would-be in U.S history. But in Korea, a mandatory audit rotation regime was adopted without thorough reviews of its consequences in the lawmaking process. The fact that the US considered enforcing mandatory audit rotation seriously seemed to have made it more convincing than empirical evidences for Korean regulators that a new mandatory audit rotation regime would improve audit quality. The reasons that Korea again went back to a non mandatory audit rotation regime is, first, the US decided not to adopt mandatory audit rotation regime and, second, the newly introduced mandatory audit rotation regime in Korea had been under a severe criticism from the auditing profession. Nevertheless, no empirical research has been done on whether mandatory audit rotation improved audit quality in Korea. So this study tries to explore the effects of mandatory audit rotation on audit quality, one of the intriguing research topics among many advanced countries, but defies research efforts because of the lack of relevant data. Because of difficulty in measuring audit quality - a qualitative variable - directly, this study uses a proxy which is discretionary accruals (DA, henceforth) and measures it using two models; modified Jones’ (1991) and Kothari et al’s (2005). Results show that there is no significant relationship between mandatory audit rotation and DA. There is no significant difference in DA between sample periods which covers three years before auditor switching and control periods which cover three years each before and after the sample periods. There is no difference in DA between the sample periods and the same time periods of the control firms. The results are the same under both models and so are they when a new variable Big 4 Auditor, which denotes whether the client is audited by Big 4 auditor or not, is added to the models. This study, despite its ex-post nature, has made contributions academically in that as the first of its kind in Korea this study empirically tests the effects of mandatory audit rotation on local audit quality. This study has its implications both to countries who consider enforcing mandatory audit rotation in the future or those who put mandatory audit rotation in place at present.
- 발행기관:
- 한국회계학회
- 분류:
- 회계학