보상위원회 도입 및 독립성에 영향을 미치는 요인:대리인문제와 감시유인을 중심으로

The purpose of this paper is to analyze empirically what factors determine voluntary formation and independence of compensation committee. This paper examines whether the owner manager, business group, outside directors and foreign shareholders influence the voluntary formation and independence of compensation committee. The data set used in this study consists of the 48 companies listed on the Korea Exchange. Samples, 190 non-financing firm-year data, are divided into two groups. One group is experimental sample consisted of 95 firm-year data voluntarily forming compensation committees. The other group is control sample composed of 95 companies not organizing compensation committees. The results of the study are as follows: First, business group is negatively related to voluntary adoption of compensation committee. This result supports the argument that control mechanisms in the business group that closely monitors management, reduce demand for compensation committee. Foreign ownership, however, is positively associated with voluntary composition of compensation committee. This result sustains that effective outside monitoring by foreign shareholders induces demand for compensation committee. Second, independence of compensation committee is positively affected by the ratio of independent outside directors to total directors on the board and foreign ownership. These results of this study may indicate that monitoring incentives of outside directors and foreign shareholders influence independence of compensation committee. The results of this paper help to understand the economic determinants of voluntary formation and independence of compensation committee. Empirical results also suggest several important implications for regulatory bodies on the effective composition of compensation committees.