코스닥 기업의 소유구조와 이익조정

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and earnings management of firms listed on Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. For this paper, earnings management measured by discretionary accruals is estimated using Dechow et al.(1995) model, Dechow et al.(1998) CFO model, and Kothari et al.(2005) performance matched model. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Earnings management measured by discretionary accruals increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. The low level or high level of managerial ownership cause earnings management to increase, but usual level of managerial ownership cause earnings management to decrease. And, earnings management is more prominent in manager-controlled firm than in owner-controlled firm. This results are consistent with the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis proposed by Morck et al.(1988), Stulz(1988), McConnell and Servaes(1990), Johnson et al.(2000), La Porta et al.(1999, 2000), and Claessens et al.(2000). In conclusion, ownership structure appears to have a critical impact on earnings management of firms listed on Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. Large shareholders of Kosdaq firms can exercise a comprehensive effects on the earnings management of firms, and can expropriate the wealth from external minority shareholders. This evidence supports the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings and managerial ownership on earnings management for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and political safeguard for external minority shareholders.