수평결합에 대한 경쟁제한성 판단기준

The core concern of the antitrust laws, including as they pertain to mergers between rivals, is the creation or enhancement of market power. In the context of sellers of goods or services, “market power” may be defined as the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time. Market power may be exercised, however, not only by raising price, but also, for example, by reducing quality or slowing innovation. In addition, mergers also can create market power on the buying side of a market. Most mergers between rivals do not create or enhance market power. Many mergers, moreover, enable the merged firm to reduce its costs and become more efficient, which, in turn, may lead to lower prices, higher quality products, or investments in innovation. However, the Agencies challenge mergers that are likely to create or enhance the merged firm's ability--either unilaterally or through coordination with rivals--to exercise market power. This article set forth the analytical framework and standards of horizontal merger assessment relating to concentration, competitive effects (including coordinated interaction and unilateral effects analysis), entry conditions, efficiencies and failure and exiting assets.