기업의 경영성과에 대한 기업지배구조의 영향

The discussion of the relationship between corporate performance and both head of the group and VOD(VLI) has attracted in the corporate governance literature. Corporate governance deals with the rights and responsibilities of a controlling shareholder, manager and various stakeholders. There are two main types of agency problem in corporate governance. The first type of agency problem arises from the separation to ownership and management. The separation of corporate managers from shareholders may lead to managers not acting in the best interest of the shareholders. The second type of agency problem arises from conflicts between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders may seek private benefits at the expense of non-controlling shareholders. In family frrms, founding family may enjoy substantial control as a result of their concentrated equity holding in their frims, their voting rights exceeding their cash flow rights. The corporate ownership structure of many Korean firms is characterized by a large wedge between control(voting rights) and ownership(cash flow rights) for controlling shareholders, which in considered a major source of agency problems in most emerging markets. This wedge creates incentives for controlling shareholders to divert firm resources for their private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders. Head of group play an important role in determining the economic performance of Korean firms. Despite the significant contribution head of the group have made to the rapid growth of the Korean economy during the last 40 years, critics claim that owner-managers have expropriated other investors to maximize their own welfare. After 1997 financial crisis, Head of the group had to carry out major restructuring. But Head of the group family haven't changed their ownership, instead, they make professional CEOs to manage their companies. After the financial crisis of 1997, it is believed that the corporate governance in the key factor to affect the corporate performance. However, in Korea, there are little studies that examine the relation between corporate governance and head of the group or VOD(VLI). This study examined whether a firm's corporate governance plays an important role in corporate performance. Corporate governance of the large business group with head of group and VOD(VLI) are investigated. More specifically, I investigated the effects of the head of the group and the different of ownership right and voting right. Previous research have only looked at VOD or VLI, but in this paper reexamination of the relation between corporate performance and both VOD and VLI. And extant empirical researches use firm-level wedge, this study furthers use group-level wedge to calculate VOD(VLI). The initial sample for this study consists of all frims that are included in the 2001-2008 Large Business Group by KFTC(Korea Fair Trade Commission)data base. A total of 244 Large Business Group observations are available over the sample period 2001-2008. The primary findings are summarized in the following way. First, Using a firm-level wedge components, finding a significant and positive correlation between ROA and both VOD and VLI. The result also show that controlling shareholders to drive the corporate performance. However Using a group-level wedge components, we find that there is no significant relation between ROA and VOD(VLI). Also, The firm-level and group-level wedge components are significant and positive correlation between ROA and VOD(VLI). Second, the Head of the group -HG dummy is not sensitive to the corporate performance, that indicates the Head of the groups firm is not related to corporate performance. Three, HG dummy and VOD(VLI) are not related to corporate performance.