企業의 社會的 責任 -會社本質論을 中心으로-

The major legal debate on corporate social responsibility is whether corporate managers should consider not only shareholders in making their decisions but also other stakeholders affected by those decisions. Over the past few decades, controversies about the corporate nature have led to a fundamental tension in the United States corporate law. The dominant thesis for the corporate nature in the United States has been shareholder primacy theory. With this view, corporate managers should make business decisions only for the maximization of the shareholders’ wealth because a corporation is funded and owned by its shareholders who invest their money for the purpose of making profits. On the other side of the debate, the norm of corporate social responsibility has been emerged through stakeholder theory to rebut the shareholder primacy thesis. Namely, underlying legal analysis on corporate social responsibility is a major debate about the nature of the corporation. It would be noticeable that stakeholder theory has become increasingly popular in the United States. We are now in a period of transition toward new corporate norm. With this in mind, this article seeks to address two questions. First, is shareholder primacy flawless and substantial enough to provide comprehensive and integrated fundamentals for issues around a corporation?Second, does shareholder primacy guide a corporate law into the right pass?This article addresses those questions by analysing the arguments supporting shareholder primacy theory and by assessing whether these arguments are strong enough and provide sufficient justification for the theory. The analysis is undertaken not only from a current legal interpretation perspective, but also from a legislative proposal as normative needs and axiology underneath perspectives. First, by interpretation of the current Korean corporate law, directors do not have to serve to maximize shareholders’ wealth. Even more, unlike the United States law, the Korean law does not require directors to owe fiduciary duties to shareholders. Rather, shareholder primacy thesis seems to be contradictory to the concept of corporate entity and its limited liability. Overall, we cannot conclude that shareholder primacy thesis overrules stakeholder primacy by relying on a legal interpretation itself. Second, by the normative approach, either shareholder primacy or stakeholder primacy, which one should we choose as a governance model to guide a corporation? On the one side, shareholder primacy thesis contends that managers should serve only for maximization of shareholders’wealth. On the other side, stakeholder primacy thesis argues that corporate managers should serve not only for their shareholders but also their stakeholders including society. Third, by the axiology approach, a debate between shareholder primacy and stakeholder primacy is basically relied on the fundamental values over market economy. Shareholder primacy theory primarily bases on the free-market economy. The Korean economic system, however, is not a pure free-market system under the constitution. If a pure free-market economy system is merely a utopia, shareholder primacy thesis and it’s bases might hamper a positive development of a corporate law. We cannot embody all the right things in law. Law should evolve just as society does. Though a corporation produces profits to it's shareholders, it also creates jobs for employees including managers. Furthermore, it provides goods and services to a society, as well.