이익정보의 유용성과 질이 경영자의 자발적 예측정보공시에 미치는 영향

The manger’s forecast of future performances reported after Regulation Fair Disclosure adopted in 2002, plays a great role in reducing information asymmetry, either between mangers and investors or among investors. A reduction in information asymmetry increases liquidity in the company’s stock and reduces cost of capital. This study examines the motivation of managers to release forecast of future performances. Specifically, we argue that a manager is more likely to disclose forecasts if the manager expects that the market will respond more strongly to the forecasts. The manager will more likely to anticipate a strong market response if the strength of the market’s reaction to each unit of earnings news were large or earnings quality was good for past quarters. For the empirical analyses, this paper uses 698 Korean listed firms from 2004 to 2008, and the financial data were figured out from Kis-Value. Consistent with our predictions, management forecast issuance is positively associated with a firm’s historic strength of the market’s response to the firm’s past earnings news (Earnings Response Coefficient: ERC). Additionally, management forecast issuance is positively associated with earnings persistence while negatively related to absolute magnitude of discretionary accruals. As such, the result shows that managers in the companies of good earnings quality are more likely to forecast future financial performance. Our paper contributes to research on some possible determinants of the motivation of managers to release forecast of future performances.