Verfassunggebung und Verfassungsänderung in Korea - insbesondere in bezug auf die erste Änderung der ‘Juni-Verfassung

The main purpose of constitution making and constitutional amendment in the constitutional history of modern Korea has been the extension of the president's term in office. As the new regimes without democratic legitimacy called themselves according to the ordinal number of republics, so were the names given to the constitutions in the same way. This practice of naming constitutions has become seldom with democratization. We can understand the Korean constitutional history as process of overcoming authoritarian system, so it seems legitimate to give two democratic constitutions of 1960 and of 1987 special names of April-Constitution and June-Constitution. The June-Constitution of 1987 is the first constitution with stability and normative power, though it was a result of constitutional amendment through the procedure prescribed in constitution. It seems, therefore, possible that the new constitution made in the system transition can be seen as constitution making in spite of the procedural way of constitutional amendment. So long as a new constitution in the future doesn’t destroy the fundamental basis of constitutional democracy it will be only an amendment of June-Constitution. The object of the ongoing discussion about the constitutional amendment encompasses almost all areas of the constitutional law. But the focus and the main political drive of the discussion lies in the form of government. None of the classical form of government like presidential, parliamentary and hybrid system can in itself promise a success. The more important thing is the question, whether the political culture is mature enough and the governmental form matches the political culture. Parliament which functions well and is willing to compromise, democratic and stable party system and the consensus on the form of government belong to the political culture. It is doubtful, if a constitutional amendment of the governmental form could strengthen theses preconditions. A model example of the constitutional amendment without factual constraints was the revision of the Swiss Federal Constitution of 1999 which came to a conclusion after 34 year long debate.