금융상품의 불완전판매와 입증책임의 역할

The purpose of this study is to consider how the allocation of burden of proof and the accountability impact on the financial firm and consumers behavior through the game theoretic approach. Main results are as follows. First, there are two types of equilibrium in the model. The first type of the equilibrium realizes when the ratio of the good-type financial products is relatively high. In this equilibrium, the firm never chooses truth telling when it sells bad-type product but the consumer always purchases the product regardless of the firm's announcement. The second type of the equilibrium realizes when the ratio of goodtype product is relatively low. In this equilibrium, the firm randomly chooses truth telling when it sells bad-type product and the consumer also randomly chooses whether she purchases the product. Second, in case a burden of proof is on the consumer, the probability of the firm's truth telling is the highest. It was followed by the case where the burden of proof is allocated by the principle of suitability. Third, regardless of the allocation of the burden of proof, the same equilibrium realizes when the consumer has only to prove the probability of firm's false telling. Fourth, it is not desirable for the firm to bear a greater burden of proof because it lowers the probability of truth telling. This is not consistent with the general opinion that the financial firms should bear a greater burden of proof to protect the consumers.