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학술논문노동법학2010.12 발행

노사의 단체교섭의 전략과 성실교섭의무

Collective Bargaining Strategy and Good Faith Bargaining Duty between Employer and Trade Union

이상덕(계명대학교)

36호, 445~473쪽

초록

Some would argue that so long as the employer is smart and goes through the motions, it can escape a finding of bad faith bargaining. Critics point to cases such as Overnight Transportation Co., 307 NLTB 666 (1992), in which the employer refused to agree to union checkoff, union security, and binding arbitration. The employer, however, met with the union numerous times over a one year period, made concessions on other substantive proposals, and provided legitimate reasons for its rejections of the remaining union proposals. In general, the Board has identified seven indicia of bad faith bargaining(Atlanta Hiton&Tower, 371 NLRB 1600 (1984)). Those indicia are: delaying tactics, unreasonable bargaining demands, unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, effort to bypass the union, failure to designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed upon provisions, and arbitrary scheduling of meetings. An absence of any of these factors, however, does not foreclose the finding of surface bargaining. The penalty for failing to bargain in good faith appears, on its face at least, to be relatively innocuous. As the statute does not require either party to make a concession, the Board is without power to direct one. The typical remedy is simply an order to cease and desist from bad faith bargaining and engage in good faith negotiations. Assuming that the employer is genuinely willing to enter into a labor agreement, thorough review and analysis will reveal a lawful course of action permitting the employer to insist upon contract provisions which will allow it to manage its business, direct its working forces, and maintain labor costs at a level which allow it to compete profitably in the marketplace. Especially integrative negotiation is relatively new method rather than traditional bargaining. We think that peaceful dialogue is necessary rather than extreme fight. And for this purpose, we think reasonable strategy will be helpful.

Abstract

Some would argue that so long as the employer is smart and goes through the motions, it can escape a finding of bad faith bargaining. Critics point to cases such as Overnight Transportation Co., 307 NLTB 666 (1992), in which the employer refused to agree to union checkoff, union security, and binding arbitration. The employer, however, met with the union numerous times over a one year period, made concessions on other substantive proposals, and provided legitimate reasons for its rejections of the remaining union proposals. In general, the Board has identified seven indicia of bad faith bargaining(Atlanta Hiton&Tower, 371 NLRB 1600 (1984)). Those indicia are: delaying tactics, unreasonable bargaining demands, unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, effort to bypass the union, failure to designate an agent with sufficient bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed upon provisions, and arbitrary scheduling of meetings. An absence of any of these factors, however, does not foreclose the finding of surface bargaining. The penalty for failing to bargain in good faith appears, on its face at least, to be relatively innocuous. As the statute does not require either party to make a concession, the Board is without power to direct one. The typical remedy is simply an order to cease and desist from bad faith bargaining and engage in good faith negotiations. Assuming that the employer is genuinely willing to enter into a labor agreement, thorough review and analysis will reveal a lawful course of action permitting the employer to insist upon contract provisions which will allow it to manage its business, direct its working forces, and maintain labor costs at a level which allow it to compete profitably in the marketplace. Especially integrative negotiation is relatively new method rather than traditional bargaining. We think that peaceful dialogue is necessary rather than extreme fight. And for this purpose, we think reasonable strategy will be helpful.

발행기관:
한국노동법학회
분류:
노동법

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