재벌의 경영권 승계 과정에서의 대리인 문제 연구

This paper intends to investigate the agency problems from tunnelling during owner-manager succession in Korean Chabols and performed the case analysis for Hyungdai Auto group and Samsung group. From the case analysis, we could found the evidence of the tunnelling during the succession process in these groups. In Hyundai Auto group, appropriation of business opportunities, internal transaction among the affiliate companies, ownership transaction between controlling shareholder and the affiliate firms, mergers among affiliate firms occurred as the means of tunnelling during the succession process. In Samsung group, ownership transaction between controlling shareholder and the affiliate firms and the transaction of stock-related bond were used as the tunnelling mechanism to transfer the wealth to controlling shareholder. In sufficient law and regulation in Korea to protect minority shareholder was shown to make it easier to use tunnelling in the succession process. This paper tried to show agency problem happening from the tunnelling during the CEO succession process and this is the evidence of agency problems even after governance reform process after the currency crisis in Korea.