이사회의 독립성, 공시의 적정성, 그리고 시장 반응 - 손익구조변경 공시 기업을 대상으로 -

There have been many accounting studies which analyze the effectiveness of independence of board of directors by using diverse measures such as discretionary accruals, conservatism, and accruals quality. Prior studies, however, have some potential problems in that their measures reflect auditing as well as managers’ argument. In order to overcome these measurement errors, we use ‘earnings correction’ (a difference between preliminary earnings and the audited income) instead of discretionary accruals. Preliminary earnings is free from the auditors’ recommendation because it is influenced by only board of directors’ opinion. The smaller this measure, the more conservative managers’ disclosures are. In empirical results, there is a negative relation between independence of board of directors and earnings correction. It means that outside directors require managers to report more conservative earnings. In addition, more independent board reduces the propensity of violation when disclosing preliminary earnings. This implies that outside directors also comply with disclosure regulation because they are afraid of their reputation in a labor market. Furthermore, in order to compare the informativeness of earnings correction, we divide our samples into high and low groups according to independence of board. We find negative market reaction in lower independence group while positive but not significant result in higher group. It is because investors regard the earnings correction in higher independence group as not managers’ opportunism but inevitable uncertainty. This study has following contributions: we eliminate auditors’ recommendation and exploit pure managers’ argument by using earnings correction. In this new measure, we also find that outside directors play significantly positive roles in enhancing the quality of disclosures.