전쟁과 무력행사에 대한 북한의 규범의식과 정책적 시사점에 대한 법경제학적 분석

Considering North Korea’s attitude after its armed attacks against South Korea since Korean War, it seems that the former do not perceive the armed attack as illegal action under international law. To North Korea, use of force on South Korea can be justified as the so-called “just war” which can not be justified under international law. It may be natural for North Korea to think that armed attack on South Korea would not constitute war crime. Because North Korea do not have any perception of illegality in armed attack, they might decide to do anther attack if expected benefit is larger than expected cost without considering costs of illegal armed attack(e.g., state responsibility, blame from international society). It implies that North Korea is a kind of rational behavior which maximizes its own interest at the cost of other countries without the perception of illegality in armed attack. To prevent next armed attack form North Korea, South Korea need to make expected cost bigger than expected benefit. If expected benefit is almost infinite, South Korea and the United States have to raise expected cost infinitely by informing to North Korea the massage that all of top-level politicians would be removed by self-defense if North Korea’s armed attack occurs.