통화정책 목표에 대한 법제적 접근의 모색
A Legal Approach to Monetary Policy Objectives
조홍균(한국은행)
59호, 1~22쪽
초록
Concerning the macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy, the European model has taken a hierarchical mandate having limited discretion,while the American model has assumed a dual mandate having wide discretion. In terms of political/social demand, the American model allows for the exercise of flexibility and hence has strength provided that the central bank exhibits great competence in the exercise of its institutional capacity. Central banks could consider both models in answering concerns over the reform of institutional arrangements providing the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and heightened uncertainties. Financial stability is of vital interest to central banks. Even in countries where financial stability is not an explicit statutory objective, central banks in practice take it into account as an important factor; they recognize it as a social imperative. Thus the basic issue can be stated as being how much weight central banks should attach to financial stability as an objective vis-à-vis other macroeconomic objectives. In addressing monetary policy objectives, a central bank possessing the requisite expertise and specialization may seek flexible interpretation with respect to the extent of delegation by the legislature if such an interpretation is reasonable or permissible. The central bank might seek proceedings to confirm the legislative intent through dialogue with the legislature. Central bank decision-makers may be considered to have the authority to rely on rule-making to resolve policy issues. The openness,accessibility, and amenability of unelected central bank decision-makers to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives would serve to secure the legitimacy of the rule-making. The expertise,experience, and specialization of the central bank are presumed to be sufficient to ensure that the “zone of twilight” issue, where concurrent authority exists or where the distribution of authority is uncertain, is addressed appropriately in view of the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables.
Abstract
Concerning the macroeconomic objectives of monetary policy, the European model has taken a hierarchical mandate having limited discretion,while the American model has assumed a dual mandate having wide discretion. In terms of political/social demand, the American model allows for the exercise of flexibility and hence has strength provided that the central bank exhibits great competence in the exercise of its institutional capacity. Central banks could consider both models in answering concerns over the reform of institutional arrangements providing the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and heightened uncertainties. Financial stability is of vital interest to central banks. Even in countries where financial stability is not an explicit statutory objective, central banks in practice take it into account as an important factor; they recognize it as a social imperative. Thus the basic issue can be stated as being how much weight central banks should attach to financial stability as an objective vis-à-vis other macroeconomic objectives. In addressing monetary policy objectives, a central bank possessing the requisite expertise and specialization may seek flexible interpretation with respect to the extent of delegation by the legislature if such an interpretation is reasonable or permissible. The central bank might seek proceedings to confirm the legislative intent through dialogue with the legislature. Central bank decision-makers may be considered to have the authority to rely on rule-making to resolve policy issues. The openness,accessibility, and amenability of unelected central bank decision-makers to the needs and ideas of the public from whom their ultimate authority derives would serve to secure the legitimacy of the rule-making. The expertise,experience, and specialization of the central bank are presumed to be sufficient to ensure that the “zone of twilight” issue, where concurrent authority exists or where the distribution of authority is uncertain, is addressed appropriately in view of the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables.
- 발행기관:
- 법학연구원
- 분류:
- 법학