미국 연방대법원의 법해석과 텍스트주의

This article discusses textualism as methods of interpretation in law. Textualism is a formalist theory of statutory interpretation, holding that a statute's ordinary meaning should govern its interpretation. Textualism opposes to inquiries into non-textual sources such as the intention of the legislature in passing the law, the problem it was intended to remedy, or substantive questions of the justice and rectitude of the law. The textualist does not give weight to legislative history materials when attempting to ascertain the meaning of a text. Textualism is often associated with originalism, and is advocated by Supreme Court Justices such as Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia. Textualism looks to the ordinary meaning of the language of the text, but it looks at the ordinary meaning of the text, not merely the possible range of meaning of each of its constituent words. Textualists acknowledge the interpretive 'doctrine of lapsus linguae', also called “scrivener's error.” This doctrine accounts for the situation when on the very face of the statute, it is apparent that there is a mistake of expression. The author of this article argues that interpretation in law should reflect social context. The author also argues that legal interpretation should combine textualism and intentionalism because interpretation in law has to consider legislative purpose as well as written text.